Preliminary and incomplete, comments welcome.
In April 2012 the Department of Justice (DOJ) sued Apple and five of the six largest publishers of trade books in the United States for conspiring to raise e-book prices. The lawsuit was prompted by the publishers' switch from the wholesale model of selling e-books to the "agency model" in April 2010. Under the wholesale model, which is the traditional way of selling books, the publisher sells the e-book to a retailer at a wholesale price. The retailer then sets the retail price at which it will sell the e-book to the consumer. In contrast, the agency model moves the ability to set retail prices from retailers to publishers. The retailer merely acts as an agent for the publisher and receives a commission for every e-book sold.
According to the DOJ complaint, "defendants' conspiracy and agreement to raise and stabilize retail e-book prices by collectively adopting the agency model and Apple price tiers led to an increase in the retail prices of newly released and bestselling e-books." 1 Indeed, in the year after the adoption of the agency model, prices for New York Times best sellers rose by more than 40 percent. This increase in retail prices indicates that reducing the well-known double marginalization problem was not the main concern of the publishers. 2 According to court documents, their declared objective regarding e-book retail prices was to avoid cannibalization of hardcover sales and avoid a decrease in the value of books as perceived by consumers. Three of the publishers immediately settled after the suit was announced, while the other two followed later that year. 3 As part of their settlements the five publishers are not allowed to prohibit the retailers from discounting their e-books for a period of two years.
In this paper we estimate differences in retail prices as a result of changes in selling model by exploiting the move away from agency contracts around the time publishers settled with the DOJ.
Our unique dataset, which is described in more detail in Section 3, allows us to estimate the effect of this switch on prices by exploiting variations in the switch from the agency to the wholesale model. We observe daily e-book prices for more than 2,000 current and former NYT best sellers sold by the major e-book retailers in the United States for a period of two years. Our sample begins in January 2012, which predates the first settlement by about nine months, and ends in December 2013, more than three months after the last settlement. The data include titles issued by the publishers that were part of the lawsuit, as well as other publishers.
1 DOJ Complaint, U.S. v. Apple, Inc., et al., April 11, 2012. 2 See for instance Cournot (1838) , Spengler (1950) and Mathewson and Winter (1984) . 3 Apple did go to court and lost, although it is appealing the decision at the time of this writing.
We use cross-publisher variation in the timing of the switch to test the effect on retail prices under the two models. Both variation in the decision to settle the lawsuit and variation in the time it takes to renegotiate contracts between publishers and retailers after the settlement led to substantial variation in the timing of the switch. The first publisher made the switch in September 2012; whereas the last publisher did so in September 2013. We employ this variation in timing in a difference-in-differences framework and find that for publishers using the agency model, Amazon prices decreased on average by 18 percent after reverting to the wholesale model, while Barnes and Noble prices decreased by 8 percent. Placebo tests support our main findings. Our estimates are robust to several specifications that deal with any serial correlation concerns that may arise due to the panel structure of our data.
Our results illustrate a case where upstream firms prefer to set higher retail prices than retailers. In Section 5 we investigate the pricing strategies of the retailers and publishers in more detail, and discuss how the pricing strategies fit into the theoretical literature on agency versus wholesale models. In particular, our findings help us clarify recent theoretical papers with conflicting predictions for prices and consumer welfare under the two models. Johnson (2013a) has argued that even though prices may initially be higher under the agency model, in the long run consumers are likely to be better off under the agency model than under the wholesale model. In Johnson's (2013a) model, retailers who use the wholesale model will initially set low prices to lock in consumers, but find it optimal to raise prices in the long run once sufficiently many consumers are locked in.
Under the agency model, on the other hand, publishers sell to retailers and thus do not face such incentives, which guarantees direct retail competition between publishers and therefore low prices in the long run. Gaudin and White (2013) propose two main reasons why we should expect higher prices under the wholesale model than the agency model in the e-book market. First, they point out that the retailer's incentive to set low prices is larger when e-books can only be read through the retailer's proprietary reader, as was the case before the agency model was adopted and e-books purchased from Amazon could only be read on a Kindle device. However, Gaudin and White argue that the switch to the agency model coincided with Amazon's release of Kindle apps for other platforms (most importantly Apple's iPad) and hence greatly reduced Amazon's incentive to keep retail prices low under the wholesale model. Second, under the agency model publishers have the incentive to set lower retail prices to avoid double marginalization.
Several other recent theoretical papers have considered the relationship between agency and wholesale models (Gans, 2012; Abhishek, Jerath, and Zhang, 2013; Condorelli, Galeotti, and Skreta, the agency model leads to higher prices if competition is stronger among retailers than among manufacturers. Gans (2012) focuses on the pricing of mobile applications on platforms and finds that a hold up problem may arise if consumers have to purchase a device to access the platform.
However, restrictions on pricing, such as most favored nation (MFN) clauses, may help overcome the hold up problem. Abhishek, Jerath, and Zhang (2013) find that the agency model leads to lower retail prices, although retail prices may be higher under the agency model if there are positive externalities from sales of complementary products (such as e-readers in the case of ebooks). Finally, Condorelli, Galeotti, and Skreta (2013) let the decision whether to use agency or wholesale models be endogenous in an environment where the retailer has privileged information about consumers' valuations and show that retailers prefer the agency model. Our paper is also related to the literature on vertical price restraints (Bonanno and Vickers, 1988; Dobson and Waterson, 2007; Mortimer, 2008) . Bonanno and Vickers (1988) find that selling through an independent retailer (as in the wholesale model) results in higher retailing prices as well as higher profits for the manufacturer than selling directly to consumers. Mortimer (2008) examines how the introduction of revenue-sharing contracts in the video industry affected firms' profits and consumer welfare. Estimates using a structural model indicate that both upstream and downstream profits increase when using revenue-sharing contracts.
Our finding of higher retail prices under the agency model is also related to the theoretical finding of Jullien and Rey (2007) that higher retail prices may also be part of a collusive upstream agreement, in which vertical price restraints keep manufacturers from engaging in secret wholesale price cuts. Even though publishers' apparent collusion raised retail prices during agency model, it did not entail higher wholesale prices. Hence, other motivations might explain this coordination, such as publishers' concerns that lower retail prices cannibalize print books sales, and by eroding the perception of the value of a book on consumers minds and eventually lead to lower prices for print books and wholesale prices for e-books.
Our paper offers several important contributions. Although a number of recent theoretical papers have studied the effects of vertical restraints on prices using the recent developments in the e-book market as motivation, our paper is the first to quantify how e-book prices have developed before and after the switch from the agency to the wholesale model. This is important, since the theoretical literature is not conclusive as to how prices will respond to a shift in selling method.
Moreover, the settlements only prohibit the use of vertical price restraints by publishers for a period of two years and the use of MFN clauses for a period of five years, which means the agency model in its original form can return in the near future. It is therefore important to know how the selling mechanism affects prices.
Although our analysis focuses on the market for e-books, our results may be of interest to any market that uses some form of agency model. Examples of markets besides e-books that use agency models include market places such as eBay (Buy It Now) and Amazon (Amazon Market Place), newspapers, as well as smartphone and tablet apps (Apple's app store).
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section we give a short overview of the events in the book industry that led to the lawsuit in 2012. We discuss the data in Section 3. Our results are presented in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss our findings in light of the firms' pricing strategies as well as the theoretical literature. Section 6 concludes.
Recent Developments in the Book Industry
One of the most significant changes in the book industry in the past ten years has been the transition from print to electronic books, or e-books. 4 Even though e-books have been around since the early 1970s, they gained greater popularity when e-readers became available with displays that made use of E Ink technology. E Ink, or electrophoretic ink, offered a much better reading experience than the displays used in other e-readers at the time, while using less battery power. Amazon released its Kindle in November 2007 and Barnes & Noble followed two years later with the Nook.
Although e-readers are primarily designed for the purpose of reading e-books, there are many other ways of reading e-books, including computers, smartphones, and tablets. Even though tablets are gaining popularity among readers of e-books, by the end of 2013 the Kindle e-reader was still the most popular device for reading e-books. 5 Amazon is also the most dominant player in terms of e-book sales. Initially responsible for more than 90 percent of all e-books sales in the United States, Amazon's market share at the end of 2013 was around 65 percent. Since April 2011 Amazon is selling more (paid) e-books than print books, which shows the growing importance of e-books for
The relatively fast growth of the e-book market is due in part to Amazon's strategy of aggressively discounting popular e-books since Kindle's launch. E-books, like print books, were sold using 4 See Baye, De los Santos, and Wildenbeest (2013) for a more general overview of recent events in the book industry. 5 Specifically, almost 40 percent of adult Americans that read e-books own a Kindle e-reader, which is the highest percentage of any single device. Figures are from the "Consumer Attitudes Toward E-Book Reading" survey (Book Industry Study Group, August 2013).
6 See http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1565581. the traditional wholesale model, in which publishers sold e-books to retailers, which then were free to set retail prices faced by the consumers. The most salient feature of Amazon's pricing strategy was Amazon's $9.99 for NYT best sellers and new releases. According to Amazon's executives, $9.99 was roughly a break-even price early on: for a hardcover new release with a list price of $25, the digital list price was 20% less, or $20. Book industry trade terms are usually in the range of a 50% purchase discount, which meant the cost to the retailer was $10. 7 However, this strategy also meant that a fraction (roughly 10%) of books was also sold at a loss, consistent with both a loss-leader strategy and potentially subsidizing consumers' adoption of the Kindle platform.
The major publishers did not agree with Amazon's pricing strategy, as they preferred higher retail prices for their popular books. In January 2009, they raised the digital list price to the print list price in an unsuccessful attempt to force Amazon to increase its retail prices. The publisher's main rationale for higher retail prices was to prevent the erosion of the perceived value of books by low e-book prices. In addition, the publishers believed that higher retail prices would diminish Amazon's dominance, prevent future downward pressure on e-book prices, and reduce cannibalization of hardcover new release sales.
In April 2010 Apple entered the e-book market as part of the launch of its tablet computer, the iPad. Apple feared it could not directly compete with Amazon as long as Amazon was heavily discounting e-books. The major publishers were unhappy with Amazon's pricing strategy as well, for reasons described above. Their shared aversion to Amazon's pricing strategies led Apple and five of the big six publishers to develop the agency model. Key to the agency model is that prices are set by the publishers, making the retailer act as an agent for the publisher. In exchange the retailer receives a commission, which was set at approximately 30 percent of the e-book price. The developments in the e-book market led the DOJ to sue Apple and the five publishers in April 2012, alleging that they conspired to fix e-book prices. Three of the publishers settled immediately (Harper Collins, Hachette, and Simon & Schuster). These settlements were finalized in September 2012 and prohibited the publishers to restrict a retailer's ability to set the retail price of any e-book for a period of two years, while the use of MFN clauses were prohibited for a period of five years.
The settlement specifically mentions that agency agreements are still allowed, but that the retailer's aggregate expenditure on discounts and promotions for e-books sold under the agency model cannot exceed the retailer's aggregate commission. In fact, the settling publishers have not switched back to the original wholesale model but to agreements that have some of the characteristics of the original agency model, but without direct retail price control by the publishers: publishers set an e-book's list price and pay the retailer a commission (around 30 percent) for every book sold. Although this new model is dubbed the modified or revised agency model by the industry, we prefer to call it the wholesale model, since the defining element of the agency model-resale price maintenance-is no longer present. Still, even though retailers are free to discount the e-book however they want, restrictions on the aggregated discounting mean that retailers cannot discount e-books too heavily.
The two remaining publishers that were part of the lawsuit (Penguin and Macmillan) settled in early 2013. Apple went to court and was found guilty of fixing prices in July 2013. It is currently in the process of appealing, arguing that its entrance into the e-book market led to more innovation and more competition.
Random House, the only Big Six publisher that did not participate in the talks with Apple, moved to the agency model in March of 2011, almost a year later than the other Big Six publishers.
Since it was not part of the lawsuit, it was not forced to abandon the agency model. However, as part of the July 2013 merger with Penguin, Random House joined Penguin in the switch to the wholesale model in September 2013.
Data
The dataset contains daily prices of e-books for a large number of titles. Around two-thirds of the titles in our sample appeared on one of the best sellers lists sometime during 2012 and 2013; we have price data for these titles from the time of their appearance the best sellers list. As a result, the number of titles in our dataset increases over time-from 417 on January 1, 2012 to 2,068 on December 31, 2013.
After the switch to the agency model, Amazon began to specifically mention on its product pages whether a publisher sets the price of an e-book. This is shown in Figure 1 for the book True Compass: A Memoir' by Edward Kennedy, which gives screenshots from before the switch to agency prices (in Figure 1 (a)) and after (in Figure 1(b) ). After the switch Amazon prominently mentions who publishes the book (in the example, Hachette Book Group) and, if the price is an agency price, who sets the price. Using this information, we observe the exact date of the switch from the agency to the wholesale model for each title in our sample. This is important, because there can be several months between the settlement dates and the actual switch dates due to the time it takes to renegotiate contracts between publishers and retailers. This is also shown in Table 2 , which for each publisher gives the exact date of the announcement of the settlement, the finalization of the settlement, and the earliest date on which Amazon stated that it, rather than the publisher, set the price of the book. Notice that there is a lot of heterogeneity in the time it took to write new contracts: Amazon started discounting again just four days after finalizing its settlement with Harper Collins, while in Penguin's case it took almost four months. The actual switch in selling model for e-books published by Macmillan, the last publisher to settle, happened four months before the finalization of the settlement, in part due to restrictions imposed by the judge that were meant to speed up the transition. The sixth big publisher, Random House, did not participate in the talks with Apple, and even though it did switch to agency contracts in 2011, it was not part of the lawsuit. Although this meant Random House could keep using the original agency model, it allowed the retailers to start discounting again on September 2013 as part of its merger with Penguin. Since we only observe the exact switch dates at Amazon, we cannot be certain that the other retailers switched at the same time. However, reports from new sites specialized in the publishing industry indicate that in most cases the other retailers followed the same day, or at most within a few days. 10 4 Empirical Analysis
Empirical Strategy
All five Big Six publishers that were part of the lawsuit have settled since the announcement of the lawsuit in April 2012 and again allow retailers to offer discounts, as in the original wholesale model.
The sixth Big Six publisher, Random House, was not part of the lawsuit, but did use the agency model at the beginning of the sample and abandoned the original agency model in September 2013, after its merger with Penguin.
Since prices are frequently changing over time, simply comparing prices before and after the switch could lead to misleading results. Instead, we exploit cross-publisher variation in the timing of the switch to different selling contracts. Using a difference-in-differences regression framework, prices for each of the Big Six publishers are compared to prices for the other publishers before and after the publisher's switch from the agency to the wholesale model. The control group at the time of the switch therefore includes publishers that are still selling under the agency model as well as publishers that have already switched.
The specification we estimate is
where price jt is the e-book price of title j at time t, wholesale jt is an indicator for whether at time t the title is sold using the wholesale model, bigsix j is an indicator for the title being published by one of the Big Six publishers, X j includes book characteristics such as days since release, sales rank, weight of the related printed book, ratings, and list price, λ p are publisher fixed effects, λ w are week fixed effects, and ε jt is an error term. Since only Big Six publishers were using the agency model, the variable wholesale jt captures the switch for each of the publishers to the wholesale model, so wholesale × bigsix can be interpreted as a difference-in-differences estimator. Table 3 presents results for the estimation of the main difference-in-differences specification. Since retailers may have different pricing strategies, we separately estimate the model for prices at Amazon and Barnes & Noble, the two largest sellers of e-books. We estimate two specifications for each retailer: a specification in which we allow for publisher fixed effects as well as a specification that allows for book fixed effects. When allowing for publisher fixed effects, the estimated coefficients on (wholesale jt × bigsix j ) imply that switching to the wholesale model reduced average e-book Both coefficients are highly significant. Allowing for book fixed effects reduces the magnitude of the effect, but not by much: as a result of the switch to the wholesale model the average percentage price decrease is 17 percent for e-books sold on Amazon and 7 percent on Barnes & Noble.
Main results
The estimated coefficients for the other controls shown in the table are very similar across retailers and specifications and indicate that books with higher sales ranks sell at lower prices.
Although the number of pages in the book only affects Barnes & Noble prices, the weight of the related printed book has a positive impact on prices of books at both retailers-this could reflect that the value of having a (zero weight) digital book is increasing with the weight of the printed alternative. Ratings on Amazon do not seem to matter for prices, although the number of reviews has a very small but negative impact on prices. The list price of the related printed book is positively related to the price of the corresponding e-book. The coefficient on the number of years since release is not significantly different from zero in any of the specifications. Notes: Dependent variable is ln(price). All specifications include week fixed effects. Standard errors (clustered by book) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%.
A crucial assumption in our difference-in-differences framework that helps us to identify the price change following a switch from the agency model to the wholesale model is that if none of the Big Six publishers would have switched to the wholesale model, they would all have continued on the same trend. Unfortunately this assumption is not directly testable, but we can get an idea of whether this parallel-trend assumption is plausible by looking at publisher-specific trends in the first few months of the sample, when all Big Six publishers were still selling e-books using the agency model. We do this by adding a linear pre-trend for each of the publishers in the period before any of the Big Six publishers had switched-if we cannot reject that all of the publishers were on the same trend in the pre-treatment period, we can have more confidence the parallel trend assumption holds in the period after the first switch as well. Table 4 gives the results for the pre-trend analysis. The results indicate that while for most of the publishers we cannot reject that they are on the same pre-trend, prices for e-books published by Simon & Schuster are on a slightly more negative trend than the others at both retailers. However, as is also shown in Table   4 , whereas adding the pre-trend does not affect the difference-in-differences estimator, excluding
Simon & Schuster from the analysis only results in larger estimated price effects of the switch. Notes: Dependent variable is ln(price). The specifications include week fixed effects and controls as in Table  3 . Publisher-specific trend parameters are multiplied by 1,000 and are relative to Harper Collins. Standard errors (clustered by book) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%.
Robustness
In this section we present a robustness analysis of the main results under various specifications. As our analysis relies on a relatively long time series of prices, we first address how susceptible our analysis is to bias due to serial correlation. In addition to the long time series, publishers do not switch to the agency model once they have switched to the wholesale model, which means that the treatment variable does not show much variation over time. As argued by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) , the resulting serial correlation problems need to be addressed to avoid underestimating the standard error of the difference-in-differences estimator. Notes: The table presents difference-in-differences coefficients estimates for different sample and control specifications. Dependent variable is ln(price). The specifications include week fixed effects (month fixed effects when aggregated by month) and controls as in Table 3 . Standard errors (clustered by book) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%.
To assess to what extent serial correlation affects our estimates, we aggregate the data into weekly as well as monthly observations. This reduces the average number of periods we are using for our analysis and should therefore alleviate the serial correlation problem. As shown in Table   5 , the estimated coefficient on wholesale × bigsix changes only slightly when collapsing the data into fewer periods. An alternative way to address serial correlation is to ignore the time series information altogether by averaging the data before and after the switch to the wholesale model.
A complication in our application is that not all publishers switch at the same time. We therefore use the technique suggested by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) to deal with aggregation when treatment dates are staggered over time. This method consists of two stages: in a first stage we regress the log of prices on a set of covariates as well as publisher fixed effects and week dummies, i.e., ln(price jt ) = β · X j + λ p + λ w + ε jt .
We then group the residuals into residuals from before the switch and residuals from after the switch and take averages (per book). In a second step we estimate the effect of the switch on prices by OLS using the two-period panel, with a dummy variable similar to wholesale × bigsix to indicate that for all observations the switch occurred in the second period of the aggregated two-period panel. The results of this residualized aggregation, shown in Table 5 , confirm that the standard errors were indeed understated when not taking serial correlation into account, as in the results shown in Table 3 , although at the same time the magnitude of the effect increases at both retailers.
Part of this reflects a difference in sample: for our main results we use all books that came out during the sample period, even if this was after a publisher's switch, while for the two-period panel we can only include books for which we have observations for both before and after the switch.
In our main specification we only include books sold by Big Six publishers. Since we have variation in the timing of the switch across the Big Six publishers, this means the control group consists of the Big Six publishers that have not yet switched to the wholesale model. Our dataset also contains data on books published by non-Big Six publishers. The books published by these smaller publishers can serve as an additional control group-these books were sold using the wholesale model throughout the entire sample period, so any difference in outcome between books published by the other publishers and those published by the Big Six publishers can potentially be attributed to the switch from the wholesale to the agency model. These results are reported in Table 5 and show an even larger effect than in our main results: an average price decrease of 21 percent for books sold by Amazon and 10 percent for e-books sold by Barnes & Noble.
In order to control for demand factors particular to a book title that may change over time,
for instance the release of the related movie, Table 5 splits the estimates for titles that are within ninety days of release and those that are older. Although the differences are minor, the effect of the switch is smaller for newer books than for older books for e-books sold by Amazon. We find the opposite effect for Barnes & Noble.
The first edition of a new title is typically released as a hardcover; once hardcover sales begin to decrease a paperback edition is released. Books that have not yet seen a paperback release therefore tend to be newer and more popular, which may affect pricing of the e-book version as well. The final two specifications of Table 6 presents difference-in-differences estimates by publisher for 3 different specifications. As the baseline results show, the effects are generally very similar across publisher, although the price effect at Amazon is much smaller after Simon and Schuster's switch to the wholesale model than after the switches of the other Big 6 publishers. However, they are not statistically significant for Barnes & Noble. The table presents difference-in-differences coefficient estimates by publisher. The baseline specification includes switching interaction coefficients for each publisher. As publishers switched at various dates, the windowed coefficients are obtained from separate regressions using observations around the time of the switch of each publisher. All specifications include controls as in the main specification in Table 3 . Dependent variable is ln(price). Week fixed effects included. Standard errors (clustered by book) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%.
Effects by Publishers
In each of the specifications so far we have used all observations before and after a publisher's switch to obtain the difference-in-differences estimator. Since publishers made the switch from the agency to the wholesale model at different times, this means that the number of observations we use before and after a switch is not the same across publishers. A potential concern is that publishers are not exposed in a similar way to any serial correlation that is left in the data, or that any differential (publisher-specific) trend that is not picked up by the week fixed effects will bias the difference-in-differences estimator. Moreover, when using all observations before and after a publisher's switch, it is difficult to distinguish between the short-run and long-run effects of the switch. To deal with these issues, the remaining columns of Table 6 give the publisher-specific difference-in-differences estimator when using shorter windows. Specifically, we look at a window that includes price observations 30 days before and 30 days after a switch, as well as a shorter window of 7 days before and 7 days after a switch. Since the publishers' switching dates are staggered and in most cases there are more than 60 days between subsequent switching dates, we have to estimate the model for each publisher separately. The reported difference-in-differences estimators in Table 6 are thus obtained from separate regressions. For most publishers the effects become smaller when shortening the window, which suggests the full price effects of the switches are spread out over time. Especially for Penguin the difference is striking: if the window is shortened the difference-in-differences estimate changes from −0.221 to, depending on the exact window, between −0.047 and −0.059. Figure 2 (a), which shows how average prices for each of the Big Six publishers have evolved over time. As indicated by the yellow curve, the large differences in price effects for Penguin are indeed because the price effects of the switch happen more gradually during a five-month period. For Penguin this period of gradual change occurs mostly before Penguin's switch. 
These findings are in line with

Placebo Tests and Synthetic Control Method
The identification of the effect of the agency model on e-book prices comes from changes in publisher-specific selling method. An alternative explanation is that these changes are driven by shocks that are not captured by our controls. For instance, the switch from the agency to the wholesale model is directly related to the settlement. Thus the drop in prices we observe may be the effect of unobserved shocks related to the lawsuit (e.g., dissolution of the presumed cartel) that are not captured by our data. To test whether our results indeed represent the effects of publishers switching to wholesale contract, we conduct several placebo tests.
In our first placebo test we assign to each of the Big Six publishers the switch date for one of the other publishers, taking into account that this will only work if the publisher has not already switched at that date. Since Harper Collins was the first to switch, we cannot estimate a placebo difference-in-differences estimator for this publisher, but we can use its switch date as a placebo switch date for all other publishers. Hachette was the second Big Six publisher to make the switch, which means for Hachette we can only use Harper Collins' switch date as a placebo switch date, but we can use Hachette's switch date as placebo switch date for all the Big Six publishers that switched at a later time. In total we end up with 14 different combinations of publishers and placebo switch dates. We estimate each of these combinations separately, using a 14-day window before and after the placebo switch date. If our main results are picking up unobserved shocks that happened around the same time as the switches, then we would expect to find similar effects for the placebo switch dates.
In our second placebo test we use data for e-books published by the other (non-Big Six) publishers. These e-books were never sold under the agency model, but we estimate our main model as if these other publishers were using agency pricing for part of the sample and use the switch dates for the different Big Six Publishers. Since the switch dates are staggered, we separately estimate the model for each of the switch dates, using a window of 14 days. Again, if our main results are picking up unobserved shocks that happened around the same time as the switches, then we would expect to find similar effects for the placebo switch dates we assigned to the other publishers.
The results for both placebo tests are reported in Table 7 give the results for the first placebo test, in which we assign a publisher's switch date to the other Big Six publishers that have not switched at that date. The last row presents the results for the second placebo test, in which we treat the other publishers as if they were using the agency model using the switch dates of the Big Six publishers. The results are very similar across retailers. Only when we assign Harper Collins' switch date to Hachette, we find the placebo effect to be negative and significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, although the effect is very small. For all other combinations we either cannot reject that the placebo difference-in-differences estimator is equal to zero, or we get a significant effect, but with a positive sign. Table 8 gives the results for a third placebo test in which we replicate the estimation of the main specification using the print book price instead of the e-book price for each of the titles in our sample. If the changes in e-book prices we observe only reflect the change in selling method, Notes: The table presents difference-in-differences estimates using the switching date of the publisher in each column imputed to the corresponding publisher on the row. Dependent variable is ln(price). The specification includes switching interaction coefficients for each publisher, week fixed effects and controls as in Table 3 . Standard errors (clustered by book) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%.
we would not expect to find a similar effect on the related print book prices. The results in Table   8 confirm that the effect is not present for print book prices: although the estimated difference-indifferences coefficient is negative for both retailers, the effect is very small and only significant at a 10 percent level in Amazon's case and at 5 percent level in the case of Barnes & Noble. Also if we split out the effect by publisher we do not find much evidence that print-book prices changed as a result of the switch, providing strong support for our main findings.
To assuage potential concerns about the quality of the control group, we also obtain differencein-differences estimates using the synthetic control group methodology of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) . They propose a methodology that deals with the uncertainty of selecting a suitable control group from many potential control groups. Notes: The table presents difference-in-differences coefficient estimates by publisher and for Big 6 publishers using ln(price) of print books as dependent variable. The specification includes switching interaction coefficients for each publisher, week fixed effects and controls as in Table 3 . Standard errors (clustered by book) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%.
Central to their methodology is the creation of a synthetic control group, which is an optimally weighted average of all possible control groups.
In our setting, the six publishers switched regimes in a staggered fashion, which limits the number of potential controls available for each switch to the publishers that have not switched to the wholesale model at the time of the treatment. For this reason we were able to construct a synthetic group only for Harper Collins (the first publisher that switched to the wholesale model)
for retail prices at Amazon and Barnes & Noble. Our estimate of the switch is the difference between the average prices under the agency model and the synthetic version after the switch to the wholesale model. Figure 4 illustrates that the effect of the switch to the wholesale model is substantial. Amazon prices dropped $2 immediately after the switch, while Barnes & Noble decreased prices on average $0.59 in the first week and $1.32 the second week after the switch. Table 9 formally presents estimates of the effect using a standard difference-in-differences methodology. The estimate closely matches the baseline results presented in Table 3 : according to the synthetic control group method, the switch to the wholesale model implies a price drop of 19 percent at Amazon and 7 percent at Barnes & Noble. Table 3 . Dependent variable is ln(price). * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%.
Effects for Other Retailers
Our dataset also contains prices for e-books sold at Books-A-Million and Apple. Table 10 presents the results for these retailers. As shown in the first column of this table, the overall effect for Books-A-Million is close to zero when estimating the main specification. However, as shown in the second column of Table 10 , when we obtain the difference-in-differences estimator for each individual Big Six publisher, the switch did have an effect for three of the publishers. However, the effect goes in opposite directions: Harper Collins saw lower prices after the switch, while Simon & Schuster and Random House both saw higher prices. Interestingly, when shortening the window to 7 days, the negative effects found for Harper Collins turns into a positive effect, which suggests the immediate effect of Harper Collins' switch to the wholesale model was for prices to go up, while prices decreased in the long run. This is pattern is confirmed by Figure 5 (a), which plots publisher-specific average e-book prices over time for Books-A-Million.
For Apple we have data up to December 2012 only. Since Harper Collins is the only publisher that switched in this period, we can only obtain the difference-in-differences estimator for this publisher. The results for Apple are presented in the last column of Table 10 . The magnitude of the price decrease at Apple for e-books published by Harper Collins is smaller than at Amazon but only slightly larger than at Barnes & Noble. The sharp drop in prices for e-books published by Notes: The table presents difference-in-differences coefficient estimates by publisher and for Big 6 publishers. For Apple, only observations for 2012 are available, hence we can estimate the effect for Harper Collins, the first publisher to switch. Dependent variable is ln(price). As publishers switched at various dates, the windowed coefficients are obtained from separate regressions using observations around the time of the switch of each publisher. The specification includes switching interaction coefficients for each publisher, week fixed effects and controls as in Table 6 . Standard errors (clustered by book) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%.
Harper Collins right after its switch is also clearly visible in Figure 5 (b).
Pricing Strategies
Our results provide evidence that the move away from the agency model in the period from 2012
to 2013 led to a substantial drop in prices of e-books, especially at Amazon and to a lesser extent, Barnes & Noble. Since publishers could directly set the retail prices of e-books during the agency period, while retailers were in control of retail prices after the switch, our findings support the notion that retail pricing strategies for e-books between big publishers and the majority were not aligned.
In this section we examine the pricing strategies of the publishers and retailers in more detail, and discuss how these pricing strategies fit into the theoretical literature on vertical restraints. In the next subsection we investigate the pricing strategies of the retailers, discuss how these relate to the findings from the theoretical literature on agency versus wholesale contracts, and provide possible explanations for any discrepancies in findings. Next, we discuss publishers' strategies concerning retail prices, thereby connecting our results to the literature on resale price maintenance.
Retailers
Recent papers that theoretically analyze the relation between agency and wholesale models argue that the relatively low e-book prices set by Amazon before the adoption of the agency model in 2010
were mainly temporary and the result of a consumer lock-in strategy (Johnson, 2013a; Gaudin and White, 2013; Li, 2014) . Low e-book prices subsidized consumers' adoption of the Kindle platform, which in turn increased Amazon's ability to raise prices in the future. In Johnson's (2013a) model, publishers may raise prices initially when using the agency model, but since publishers sell to multiple retailer platforms and are thus not affected by lock in, future prices are likely to be lower than under the wholesale model. Gaudin and White (2013) argue that the switch to the agency model in 2010 coincided with the release of Kindle apps for competing devices such as the iPad. This meant that Amazon's Kindle was no longer essential for reading e-books, and as a result Amazon's incentive to keep e-book prices low diminished. Gaudin and White thus argue that Amazon will raise e-book prices when given the ability to set retail prices. However, we find that Amazon's retail prices decreased after it regained the ability to set retail prices, and have remained consistently low despite the availability of Kindle apps for mobile, tablet, and computer platforms. 12
Although our estimates do not provide direct support for these theories, the time period after the switch to the wholesale model might be too short to capture the potential incentive for retailers to increase prices. Pricing patterns for Barnes & Noble do suggest that even though prices decreased
initially, there appears to be a strong upward trend for most of the Big Six publishers after the switch. For instance, as shown in Figure 2 Kindle is still an essential part of its business. 13 Our finding that there is a negligible effect on e-book prices sold by Books-A-Million is consistent with this explanation: Books-A-Million was never in the business of selling e-readers, so, as in Johnson's framework, it had less incentive to set low prices in order to lock in consumers. To better illustrate retailers pricing strategies, especially after in post-agency period, Table 11 presents the average e-book prices as a proportion of the digital list price set by the Big Six publishers for June 18, 2014. 14 Amazon's average e-book prices for books from the Big Six publishers were sold at 82 percent of the digital list price set by the publishers. This means that-assuming the thirty percent commission rule used with the agency contracts-the average book was not sold at a loss. The average discount is roughly the same across publishers, although the discount is less for books published by Hachette. However, Amazon does discount popular books more than less popular titles. For instance, as shown in Table 11 , the 1 percent most popular books in terms of kindle sales rank are sold at 70 percent of the digital list price, whereas this number is 85 percent for e-books in the lower half of the sales rank distribution. In fact, as shown in the last panel of Table   11 , roughly 15 percent of e-books sold at Amazon are sold at less than 70 percent of the digital list price, which most likely means these titles are sold at a loss. Note that these numbers are consistent with the proportion of books that Amazon sold at a loss before the agency model. 15 Although the books sold below wholesale cost have the largest sales, this is not evidence that Amazon's e-book is not independently profitable and it is consistent with a loss-leader strategy. Our data over-samples popular books, so we do not observe margins of the large number of older or "backlisted" titles with higher margins which are the "vast majority of [e-book] sales through Amazon". 16 The other two retailers in Table 11 sell their books at much higher prices, although they seem to be using a similar loss-leader strategy as Amazon, by giving larger discounts for the more popular titles.
As shown by a number of empirical studies, Amazon sets low book prices despite the relatively inelastic demand it faces. For instance, Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) to 2013 and find demand for both print books and e-books to be relatively inelastic as well, from which they conclude that both print book and e-book prices are set below static profit maximizing levels.
Amazon's strategy of pricing popular e-books below wholesale cost might be a more comprehensive strategy of customer acquisition and retention within Amazon's ecosystem (such as Amazon Prime), and not necessarily intended to subsidize consumers' adoption of the Kindle platform or sale of older (or backlisted) e-books with higher margins (e.g., Abhishek, Jerath, and Zhang, 2013) .
15 The percentage of books below wholesale cost is obtained from Figure 12 of the direct testimony by Orley Ashenfelter, which is available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/apple/exhibits/px-1097.pdf.
16 Direct testimony by Amazon's Vice President of Kindle Content (http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/apple/exhibits/px-0837.pdf). Backlisted [print] books also account for at least half of the sales of many independent bookstores ("Publisher's Backbone: Older Books", the NYT, 3/26/1990. Amazon has arguably the largest breadth and depth of product variety and as such, Amazon could benefit from selling other-perhaps more profitable-products to its e-book customers.
Publishers
An essential component of the agency model is that the publishers directly set retail prices for e-books-a practice known as resale price maintenance. Our paper provides an illustration of a vertical market in which upstream firms prefer retail prices to be higher than those set by the downstream retailers. This is contrary to the textbook example of the efficiency enhancing role of resale price maintenance, in which vertical restraints are used to eliminate double marginalization.
Our analysis shows that the Big Six publishers would set retail prices at higher levels than what retailers, in particular Amazon, would set. The theoretical literature on resale price maintenance gives several explanations why upstream firms prefer resale price maintenance with higher prices than those set by retailers. For instance, resale price maintenance can be used by upstream firms to give retailers sufficient incentive to provide a high level of service-if retailers can no longer compete in prices, they have to compete in service to attract consumers (see Telser, 1960; Mathewson and Winter, 1984) .
Alternatively, resale price maintenance may be used as a way to facilitate collusion between the upstream firms. Jullien and Rey (2007) show that in situations where retail prices are not only driven by wholesale prices set by the upstream firms but also respond to local demand and cost shocks, resale price maintenance will make it easier to detect wholesale price deviations from a collusive agreement. Indeed, according to the DOJ's complaint, the adoption of identical pricing tiers that were part of the agency model would not have happened without the publishers conspiring.
An important question is therefore whether the large price drops we observe after the settlements is simply because the lawsuit put an end to "the conspiracy to fix prices," or whether this is due to the differences in selling method. 17 Put differently, what retail prices would the publisher have set under the agency model if there were no coordination with other publishers? Two features of our data may help in answering this question. First of all, even though the lawsuit was announced in April 2012, for all Big Six publishers prices remained high until close to the actual switch date, even for the three publishers that settled immediately. Secondly, we find price effects for Random House that are of similar magnitude as the other Big Six publishers, even though Random House was not part of the publishers' collusive coordination. If the price decreases we observe are purely driven by the breakup of the presumed cartel, one would not expect to find a similar price effect for books published by Random House. This is inline with results for the various placebo tests in Section 4.3, which indicate that the price effects we find cannot be attributed to any other shocks happening around the times of the switches.
Although the resale price maintenance component that is inherent to the agency model may have facilitated the publishers' goal to achieve higher e-book retail prices, it does not necessarily imply higher short-run e-book profits for the publishers. In fact, according to court documents the higher retail prices during the agency period did not lead to higher e-book profit margins for the publishers-on average e-book profit margins decreased in comparison to the pre-agency period due to the relatively higher commission for the retailers. 18 This suggests the implementation of the agency model was not meant to increase short-run profits from the publishers' e-book business, but had other reasons such as fear of cannibalization of sales of newly released hardcover titles, the rising dominance of Amazon, and a decreased perceived value of books by consumers.
Conclusions
In this paper we have provided evidence that after the publishers lost their ability to directly set retail prices, prices for e-books decreased substantially at Amazon and Barnes & Noble, the two largest sellers of e-books in the United States. Even though for Apple we only observe e-book prices for 2012, and can therefore only investigate how a single publisher's Harper Collins' switch affected e-book prices, we find a substantial drop in Apple's e-book prices for the switching publisher as well. Books-A-Million is the only retailer in our data for which we fail to find an effect on e-book prices that can be attributed to the switch.
Our empirical findings do not provide much support for claims in recent theoretical papers that e-book prices are likely to be lower under the agency model than under the wholesale model. One reason that prices are conjectured to be lower under the agency model is that under the wholesale model, retailers face incentives to raise prices once a sufficiently large number of consumers is locked into their platforms, while publishers do not face these incentives under the agency model. Although our findings so far do not provide evidence for such behavior, it may be too soon to tell, 18 The five publishers under the DOJ complaint received on average less per e-book sold: "the average decrease in the average per unit net revenue was 15.1%". Publishers knew that on average they will receive less per e-book sold under agency, explicitly recognized by Hachette: "[agency model] ' would be to swap a significant amount of current margin to change the public perception of price...'." Source: Direct testimony of Richard J. Gilbert (http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/apple/exhibits/px-1105.pdf).
since these arguments mostly apply to the long run. In fact, price trends based on more recent data than we have used in our main analysis suggest that e-book prices are on an increasing trend at both Amazon and Barnes & Noble, especially for the newer and more popular titles.
Our analysis has identified several reasons why average retail prices decreased after the retailers were back in control of prices. For instance, we have shown that all retailers provide discounts for the most popular titles, with Amazon often using them as loss leaders. Other reasons why retailers prefer low prices are consumer lock in and intertemporal price discrimination. Amazon's self-declared objective is to deliver value to consumers by being consumer-centric, which includes selling products at low prices. 19 Since Amazon is by far the largest retailer in this industry, independent of what is driving its relatively low prices, it is likely that its pricing strategy puts pressure on the other retailers to keep prices low as well.
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